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Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility
for Probation or Parole Release
This article addresses the impact of Alleyne v. United States1
on state statutes that restrict an offender’s eligibility for
release on parole or probation. Alleyne is the latest of several
Supreme Court cases applying the rule announced in the
Court’s 2000 decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey.2 In Apprendi
the Court held that the government must establish beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury any fact (other than prior con-
viction) that permits the judge to impose a higher maxi-
mum sentence. For thirteen years, the Court used this
ceiling-raising metric each time it applied its rule to a new
context. In Alleyne, the Court modified that principle, and
declared that the Apprendi rule not only applies to findings
that permit a higher maximum sentence, but also applies to
findings that mandate a higher minimum sentence. Because
federal law required that the judge in Alleyne’s case impose
a sentence of no less than seven years’ incarceration for the
crime of ‘‘using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime
of violence’’ if Alleyne had ‘‘brandished’’ a firearm, Alleyne
had a right to seek a jury’s determination of that aggravating
fact.
To apply Alleyne, courts must for the first time deter-
mine what constitutes a minimum sentence and when that
minimum is mandatory. These questions have proven
challenging for judges in states that authorize indetermi-
nate sentences (subject to discretionary release on parole)
and have statutes that delay the timing of eligibility for
release based upon judicial findings at sentencing. Alleyne
also raises similar questions, in both determinate and
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions, for statutes that
deny or restrict the option of imposing probation or a
suspended sentence instead of incarceration upon judicial
fact finding. Disagreement about Alleyne’s application is
understandable; extending Alleyne to findings that alter
eligibility for release has the potential to disrupt signifi-
cantly the sentencing systems in several states.
In this Article, we argue that Alleyne invalidates any state
statute that, upon a judicial finding of fact at sentencing
(other than prior conviction), requires a judge to delay or
deny eligibility for release on probation or parole. The floor
of the sentencing range for an indeterminate sentence is
the period of incarceration the offender must serve before
he can be considered for release on parole. In states such as
Michigan and Pennsylvania, statutes that require the judge
to impose a longer term prior to eligibility once certain facts
are found operate just like the statute in Alleyne, increasing
the minimum sentence. Precluding probation based on
a judicially found fact also raises the floor of the penalty
range under Alleyne, aggravating it from a noncustodial
sentence to incarceration.
Alleyne’s threat to existing statutes varies by state.
Some states will avoid the problem entirely. Arkansas,
Mississippi, and New York, for example, can essentially
ignore Alleyne because statutes that delay or deny parole or
probation eligibility apply to every defendant convicted of
specified offenses; no additional factfinding (with the
exception of prior conviction3) must occur at sentencing
before those minimum sentences apply. A number of other
states, including California, Colorado, Hawaii, and West
Virginia, do have statutes restricting eligibility for release
on parole or probation upon judicial findings of particular
facts, but will escape post-Alleyne challenges to these par-
ticular statutes because state law already requires juries to
decide those facts. Presently, however, sixteen states—
Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, and Rhode Island—have one or more statutory provi-
sions that limit either parole or probation eligibility based
on additional judicial findings at sentencing, provisions we
argue are unconstitutional after Alleyne.
This count of affected states would have included Kan-
sas as well, but Kansas lawmakers, prompted by a remand
from the Supreme Court,4 swiftly recognized the vulnera-
bility under Alleyne of state statutes limiting parole eligi-
bility for convicted murderers. In an emergency legislative
session, they amended the law to require jury findings.5
Other states have been slower to react. New Jersey’s high
court has agreed to review the issue.6 Lower courts in
Pennsylvania have admitted Alleyne’s probable impact
on statutes in that state.7 By contrast, in Michigan, with
a sentencing system built upon minimum parole-eligibility
ranges, state courts have confronted and rejected argu-
ments that Alleyne renders the state’s sentencing scheme
unconstitutional.
Remarkably, although dozens of state laws limiting
probation or parole release are unconstitutional after
Alleyne, sentencing scholars seem not to have noticed.
One explanation for this blind spot may be that much of the
academic writing about sentencing focuses on federal law,
and federal courts have not yet grappled with this issue.
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Federal defendants prosecuted today would not encounter
a judge-found parole limitation at sentencing; discretionary
release on parole was abolished for federal defendants in
the 1980s.8 As for probation, federal statutes limiting pro-
bation eligibility upon a finding of fact other than convic-
tion are rare.9 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain
many such provisions, but they are now advisory.10 And
although Alleyne is a constitutional rule that state defen-
dants are already raising in federal habeas proceedings, as a
‘‘new’’ rule it will be available only to those prisoners whose
convictions were not yet final in 2013. As a consequence, it
may be some time before the lower federal courts address
the application of Alleyne to parole and probation eligibility
provisions in the states.11 For the time being, judicial dis-
cussion of the issue has been limited to state decisions.
This article provides analyses that litigants and judges
might find useful as these Alleyne challenges make their
way through the courts. It also offers a menu of options for
state lawmakers who would prefer to amend their sen-
tencing law proactively in order to minimize disruption of
their criminal justice systems.12
I. The Ruling in Alleyne
Apprendi v. New Jersey,13 the source of the rule extended by
the Court in Alleyne, grew out of legislative efforts to
structure judicial sentencing discretion. Beginning in the
1970s, new statutes tied factfinding at sentencing to higher
sentencing ranges. Initially, the Court tolerated this prac-
tice. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,14 it held that a defendant’s
constitutional rights were not violated by a statute that
raised the minimum penalty for an offense to five years if
the judge found at sentencing that the defendant had a gun,
noting that the finding did not change the maximum
punishment the judge could impose for that conviction.
A finding that raises only the floor of the sentencing range,
the Court reasoned, is not an element of the offense, that is,
part of the charge that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury.15
Apprendi involved just the situation distinguished in
McMillan—a statute that exposed the defendant to a higher
punishment ceiling based on a judicial finding of fact at
sentencing.16 The Court held that under the Sixth
Amendment, such a fact must be considered an element of
what is essentially an aggravated offense, and that permit-
ting a judge to determine that fact at sentencing deprived
the defendant of his right to a jury determination of every
element of an offense. Other than the fact of prior convic-
tion, the Court held, ‘‘any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’17 The Court later clarified that when a finding of
fact is required to impose a sentence above a binding
guideline range,18 or to impose a higher maximum fine,19
it falls within the Apprendi rule.
Although confirming that the rule in Apprendi applied
whenever a fact found by the judge raised the ceiling of
a sentencing range, the Court in Harris v. United States20
declined to overrule McMillan and extend the rule to judi-
cial factfinding that raised the punishment floor. Not until
2013 did a new five-justice majority overrule Harris and
McMillan, concluding in Alleyne that ‘‘the principle applied
in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the
mandatory minimum.’’21
Alleyne, like Harris, had been convicted of violating
a federal statute that designated a sentence of ‘‘not less than
5 years’’ for anyone who ‘‘uses or carries a firearm’’ in rela-
tion to a ‘‘crime of violence,’’ and ‘‘not less than 7 years’’ ‘‘if
the firearm is brandished.’’22 The jury that convicted Alleyne
indicated on the verdict form that he had ‘‘[u]sed or carried
a firearm’’ but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was
‘‘[b]randished.’’23 At sentencing Alleyne argued that because
the jury did not find brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt,
he was subject only to the five-year mandatory minimum.
Relying on Harris, the judge rejected this argument, found
that the government had established brandishing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and imposed a sentence of
seven years. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Alleyne,
traced the ‘‘linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges
(defined by both the minimum and the maximum)’’ at
common law, and noted ‘‘a well-established practice of
including in the indictment, and submitting to the jury,
every fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment.’’24 This rule, he explained, allowed the
defendant to predict the judgment, if convicted, from the
face of the indictment. A ‘‘fact increasing either end of the
range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient
of the offense,’’ he wrote. ‘‘Elevating the low-end of a sen-
tencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with
the crime: the defendant’s ‘expected punishment has
increased as a result of the narrowed range’ and ‘the pros-
ecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory mini-
mum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment
than he might wish.’’’25 The Sixth Amendment, he
explained, ‘‘applies where a finding of fact both alters the
legally prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates
the penalty.’’26 He reiterated that the Constitution’s pro-
tections, rooted in the common law, ensured that a criminal
charge would inform the accused what the punishment will
be and that all facts essential to that punishment would be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before that
punishment could be imposed.27 Justice Breyer, providing
the fifth vote, noted in a separate opinion that even though
he continued to disagree with Apprendi, he concurred with
the Court’s decision because it seemed ‘‘highly anomalous
to read Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing
facts that permit a judge to impose a higher sentence while
not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that require
a judge to impose a higher sentence.’’28
II: Applying Alleyne to Eligibility Statutes
To determine the scope of the new rule in Alleyne, courts
must decide when state law conditions a ‘‘mandatory
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minimum’’ sentence upon factfinding by the judge.
Analytically, it is helpful to separate this inquiry into two
parts, as the Court suggested when it stated in Alleyne that
the rule applies when ‘‘a finding of fact both alters the legally
prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates the
penalty.’’29 We examine first when a restriction on
a defendant’s eligibility for release constitutes a more
aggravated minimum sentence, and second when that
restriction is mandatory, that is, when factfinding alters
‘‘the legally prescribed range.’’ We also address opposing
arguments based on history, implementation, and scope.
A. Defining When a Restriction on Eligibility for
Release Constitutes the ‘‘Minimum’’ Sentence
The minimum term in Alleyne was clear; the statute stated
the sentence as ‘‘not less than 5 years’’ or, with brandishing,
‘‘not less than 7 years.’’ Alleyne’s federal sentence was
determinate—that is, the term of incarceration was set at
sentencing and not subject to early release by paroling
authorities. Federal defendants receive a single sentence and
serve that sentence; they are not sentenced to a range within
which they might or might not be released depending on
decisions by paroling authorities at a later time.
1. Term Before Release Eligibility as ‘‘Minimum’’
Unlike the federal courts, a majority of states continue to
impose indeterminate sentences. In these states, where
a parole board or other paroling authority retains the option
of releasing an offender before the maximum sentence
imposed is served, what is the ‘‘minimum’’ sentence for
purposes of Alleyne? Logically, the minimum, or floor of the
sentencing range, is the period of incarceration that must
be served before a defendant may first be considered for
release. For example, if release is barred until after the
offender has served fifty years, then the minimum sentence
is fifty years. Many states equate eligibility dates with
minimum sentence.30 The parole eligibility date in a sys-
tem of discretionary release is just as impermeable a floor
as the minimum seven-year term in the determinate sen-
tencing system in Alleyne.
The rule in Alleyne comes into play whenever a more
severe or ‘‘aggravated’’ minimum sentence is triggered by
a factual finding at sentencing. Thus, if a statute requires
the judge who finds a specified fact at sentencing to impose
a term of incarceration with a release eligibility date that is
later than the date that would apply in the absence of that
finding, the defendant has a right to a jury determination of
that specified fact. By delaying eligibility for release, the
finding ‘‘[e]levat[es] the low-end of a sentencing range and
heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime.’’31
The same is true if the fact eliminates eligibility for release.
Although some states do not delegate decisions about
the timing of parole eligibility to the sentencing judge,32
many states do expect judges to select the minimum term,
and have enacted statutes that require the judge to delay or
deny eligibility for release on parole based on a finding of
fact at sentencing. All of these statutes are potentially
unconstitutional under Alleyne. These provisions include
restrictions on release for offenders whose offense occurred
while on release for another crime,33 whose crime involved
gangs34 or weapons,35 victimized police officers,36 children,
or the elderly,37 or involved other circumstances not proven
as part of the underlying offense.38 For example, before it
was amended after Alleyne to require jury findings, a statute
in Kansas required the judge to order a defendant convicted
of premeditated murder to serve at least forty years before
becoming eligible for release on parole (‘‘a hard-40’’ sen-
tence)39 if the judge found that the defendant committed
the murder ‘‘in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner,’’40 or had a previous felony conviction ‘‘in which
the defendant inflicted great bodily harm.’’41
One difference between the determinate sentence in
Alleyne and an indeterminate sentence is that once a federal
sentence is served, the offender is always released, but once
an offender serving an indeterminate sentence reaches
eligibility for parole, he need not be released. One might
argue that in an indeterminate system, the minimum sen-
tence is not the earliest eligibility date that the law allows the
judge to set, but instead is whatever term the paroling
authority later decides the offender must serve. But this
would miss the point of the Apprendi/Alleyne line of cases.
The Apprendi rule targets statutes that essentially short-
circuit the Bill of Rights requirements of notice and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury by shifting factfinding
that determines the sentencing range away from the trial to
the sentencing phase. The minimum sentence that matters
in Alleyne is the floor of the range available to the sentencing
judge, the penalty ‘‘affixed to the crime,’’42 not the sentence
that might actually be served by the offender. That a paroling
authority may ultimately decide not to release the defendant
when he first becomes eligible is irrelevant. What is crucial is
that the legislature has narrowed the penalty range available
to the trial judge once the specified fact is determined.
Similarly, because Alleyne is concerned only with fact-
finding that legislatures have given to judges rather than
juries, delays in release eligibility that result from the
decisions of corrections officials made after initial sen-
tencing, even when such decisions depend upon findings
of fact, are not affected by Alleyne.43 Corrections officials’
decisions denying release on parole after eligibility, delay-
ing release eligibility by refusing to grant or revoking good
time credit (also called earned or gain time credit),44
reclassifying the prisoner so that his ability to earn good
time credit is reduced,45 as well as findings by corrections
officials regarding satisfaction of statutory criteria for
release after the date of first eligibility,46 including medical
conditions47 and overcrowding,48 all fall outside of the
Apprendi principle. These decisions may change the actual
sentence served, but they do not ‘‘increase[] either end of
the range’’ available to the sentencing judge.
2. Alternatives to Incarceration as ‘‘Minimum’’
Probation eligibility statutes in both determinate and
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions are vulnerable after
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Alleyne as well. Courts have already found that when state
law designates probation as the presumptive sentence
maximum for a minor offense, judicial factfinding that
authorizes incarceration operates to raise the ceiling of the
penalty range and thus triggers the rule in Apprendi. 49 This
is because incarceration is a more severe sentence than
probation, making the additional fact permitting incarcer-
ation an element of a more aggravated offense. Similarly, if,
upon a specified finding at sentencing, a statute removes
the judge’s ability to impose probation, suspend a sentence,
or impose an alternative to incarceration, that finding raises
the floor of the penalty range under Alleyne, aggravating it
from a potential noncustodial penalty to required
incarceration.
Examples of such statutes include provisions denying
probation for those who have refused drug treatment,50
victimized children or family members,51 committed their
offenses while on release from or awaiting trial on another
crime,52 or used firearms.53 All of these provisions are
threatened by the holding in Alleyne. Also implicated are
statutes that upon a finding of fact by the judge mandate
higher minimum terms of supervised release after serving
a term of incarceration54 or higher minimum fines as part
of the sentence.55
3. Rebutting Opposing Arguments
To oppose the characterization of eligibility restrictions as
minimum sentences, we anticipate states will raise three
arguments, drawing from the reasoning in the Court’s
Apprendi cases.
a. Lack of Historical Basis. First, states may argue that
both parole and probation are relatively modern inventions,
lacking the historical pedigree of the graded terms of
incarceration that appeared in early American criminal
codes. Decisions affecting eligibility for parole or probation
would have been completely unknown in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Discretionary parole release
and the option of using community supervision in lieu of
incarceration swept the nation only in the early twentieth
century.56 If the meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s Jury
Clause is limited to the historical context surrounding its
adoption, then it may not regulate factfinding that alters
eligibility for probation or parole.57 Indeed, Justice Thomas,
the author of Alleyne, has been one of the most consistent
voices on the Court for adherence to historical context in
interpreting the Jury Clause.58
The Court did rely upon history to derive its general rule
in Apprendi,59 but it has refused to use history as a litmus
test for each and every application of that general rule. Early
American criminal codes appeared not to include statutes
like the one in Alleyne, for example, that keyed a higher
minimum sentence to a particular fact, but did not at the
same time raise the maximum sentence.60 Sentencing
guidelines like those in Blakely or Booker were also creatures
of the late twentieth century, but this novelty did not exempt
them from the Apprendi rule either. As Justice Thomas
explained in his dissent in Harris, ‘‘The Court has not
previously suggested that constitutional protection ends
where legislative innovation or ingenuity begins. Looking to
the principles that animated the decision in Apprendi and
the bases for the historical practice upon which Apprendi
rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory
minimums), there are no logical grounds for treating facts
triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts
that increase the statutory maximum.’’61
Justice Breyer, providing the fifth vote in Alleyne, agreed
the application of Apprendi to mandatory minimum statutes
was compelled by ‘‘principle’’ and ‘‘logic.’’ He found it
‘‘highly anomalous to read Apprendi as insisting that juries
find sentencing facts that permit a judge to impose a higher
sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing
facts that require a judge to impose a higher sentence.’’62
It would be even more ‘‘anomalous’’ to hold that a defendant
has a right to a jury determination of a fact that raises the
penalty floor for his crime from five to seven years, but not if
it raises the floor from life with the possibility of parole after
20 years to life without the possibility of parole. In both
circumstances the defendant is unable to predict the legally
authorized penalty range ‘‘from the face of the felony.’’63
b. Disruption and Prejudice. Another potential objection
to the application of Alleyne to factfinding that alters parole
and probation eligibility is the practical difficulty states may
face if they were required to implement the jury right in this
context. Accommodating Alleyne could require the aban-
donment of appellate oversight of formerly enforceable
limits on judicial sentencing discretion, or the injection of
additional, possibly prejudicial, factfinding into jury trials.
But this argument, like the historical claim, is unlikely
to succeed in defeating what is otherwise a principled
application of the Apprendi rule. In Alleyne, Booker, Blakely,
Southern Union, Cunningham, and Apprendi itself, advocates
opposing the rule have described a similar ‘‘parade of hor-
ribles,’’ but the Court, as Justice Scalia has observed, has
repeatedly watched that parade pass by without
‘‘salut[ing].’’64
c. Probation and Parole as Mitigated Penalties. A final
argument against applying Alleyne in this context is that
a judicial decision to permit release rather than incarcera-
tion mitigates the penalty that would otherwise apply, and
Apprendi does not apply to factfinding that mitigates the
legally prescribed range of punishment.65 The statutes
collected here, however, do not involve factfinding that
mitigates the penalty.
Certainly some state statutes that regulate when a judge
may impose a sentence of probation or a suspended
sentence do designate incarceration as the presumptive
sentence, and then assign to the defendant the burden of
proving at sentencing those facts required for probation
eligibility. If a statute is set up this way, the judge’s deter-
mination of those facts at sentencing does not aggravate the
penalty range. Rather, incarceration is already within the
range of penalties prior to the judge’s factfinding; that
factfinding only mitigates or lowers the floor of the range.66
But the probation statutes that violate Alleyne are not set up
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this way. Instead, they authorize either probation or incar-
ceration for the offense of conviction and raise the penalty
floor to incarceration, eliminating the probation option,
upon a finding of fact at sentencing.67 Probation may have
originated as a form of judicial clemency—mercy that
a court could dispense at its discretion to soften the pun-
ishment of what would otherwise always be incarceration.
But once a legislature expressly denies the opportunity for
probation in cases in which a particular fact is established at
sentencing, it has removed the judge’s discretion to dis-
pense that leniency. By permitting probation in all cases
except those in which the fact is established, the legislature
has created two separate penalty ranges, one more aggra-
vated than the other. In the words of Alleyne, ‘‘the core
crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum
sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each
element of which must be submitted to the jury.’’68
The same can be said for statutes that regulate a judge’s
authority to set the minimum term an offender must serve
before becoming eligible for release on parole. Through the
1970s, in states that granted judges the discretion to select
a minimum eligibility date at sentencing, accelerating that
date may have been a discretionary act of leniency. Today, if
a statute permits a judge upon finding certain facts at sen-
tencing to impose a minimum term that is even lower than
a presumptive minimum term, neither Apprendi nor
Alleyne requires a jury to determine those facts; that fact-
finding does indeed mitigate the range.69 But once a legis-
lature requires a judge to delay the date of eligibility for
release in cases in which a designated fact is established at
sentencing, the legislature has created two separate penalty
ranges, one for cases without that fact, and another, more
aggravated range for cases with that fact.70
B. Defining When the Higher Minimum Sentence
is ‘‘Mandatory’’
The Court in Alleyne limited its stated rule to factfinding
that triggers more aggravated minimum sentences that are
‘‘mandatory,’’ that is, factfinding that ‘‘alters the legally pre-
scribed range.’’ Defining what is or is not a mandatory
minimum is a new issue introduced by the Alleyne ruling.
The meaning of this concept can be derived from the
Court’s earlier decisions applying the Apprendi rule. The
seven-year minimum in Alleyne was mandatory because it
was enforceable on appeal. Had a judge refused to impose
that sentence and imposed a lesser sentence instead, the
government could have secured relief on appeal.71 In
Booker, the Court rendered the Guidelines ‘‘advisory’’ and
compliant with the Sixth Amendment, rather than ‘‘man-
datory’’ and unconstitutional, by invalidating those provi-
sions in the Sentencing Reform Act that permitted the
courts of appeals to enforce compliance with those guide-
lines. It is the potential for reversal on appeal, the Court
explained, that makes the sentence mandatory.72
Thus, the parole and probation disqualification provi-
sions vulnerable under Alleyne are those that are enforce-
able on appeal, so that if a judge imposed a sentence that
allowed release sooner than the statute required, the state
could have the sentence overturned. Conversely, if state law
grants complete discretion to a trial judge to delay the date
of eligibility for release after finding an aggravating fact,
then it would not fall within the Alleyne rule, any more than
advisory guidelines fall within Blakely.
Importantly, the seven-year minimum sentence in
Alleyne was considered a mandatory minimum sentence
even though under federal law Alleyne might have earned
time off his sentence in ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘earned’’ time credits,
and secure release in less than seven years. The ‘‘legally
prescribed’’ floor of the range in Alleyne was the seven-year
determinate term, despite the possibility that good or
earned time would reduce the actual sentence served below
seven years.73 Likewise, the possibility or even probability
that good or earned time credits will reduce the period of
incarceration required before eligibility for release from an
indeterminate sentence does not make the minimum
period before eligibility for release any less mandatory.
Alleyne also makes it clear that a minimum term trig-
gered by a judicial finding of fact can be mandatory even
when the judge has the option of imposing the same sen-
tence without the challenged factfinding.74 In Alleyne itself
the judge had discretion to impose seven years without
finding the defendant had brandished a gun. Put differ-
ently, Alleyne controls whenever factfinding raises the floor
of the sentencing range even if the ceiling stays the same.
Courts rejecting the application of Alleyne to the sen-
tencing system in Michigan appear to have misunderstood
this point. Michigan’s system uses a sentencing grid that
designates, at the intersection of criminal history and
offense level scores, a ‘‘recommended’’ term of incarcera-
tion after which the offender would be eligible for parole.
The offense level score is determined by the required
combination of a specified set of offense variables, scored
by the judge at sentencing.75 The judge is not permitted to
impose an eligibility date earlier than that recommended by
the grid, unless he finds a ‘‘substantial and compelling
reason’’ for doing so, and that finding may be challenged on
appeal.76 The Michigan Court of Appeals has reasoned that
this scheme does not implicate Alleyne because the judicial
factfinding under the state’s guidelines merely ‘‘inform[s]
the trial judge’s sentencing discretion within the maximum
determined by statute and the jury’s verdict.’’77 This con-
clusion was correct when Harris was in force. But Alleyne
overruled Harris; states are no longer free to use judicial
factfinding at sentencing to ‘‘inform’’ sentencing discretion
within the maximum sentence authorized by conviction,
when that guidance mandates a higher minimum
sentence.78
Nor does the presence of an exception or departure
provision that would allow a trial judge to impose a lower
minimum sentence in unusual cases make the presump-
tive minimum term any less ‘‘mandatory.’’ Consider the
Supreme Court’s earlier treatment of the same issue in
connection with the range ceiling or maximum sentence, in
its decisions in Blakely, Booker, Cunningham, and Gall. The
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Court has consistently rejected the argument that when
a judge is allowed to depart upward from the presumptive
sentence, that presumptive sentence is not the ‘‘maximum’’
sentence.79 For example, in Gall, the Court reasoned that if
a statute defines a standard or test that must be met in order
to depart from the guidelines, the guidelines are still con-
sidered mandatory.80
Just as a presumptive maximum sets the ceiling or
maximum of a penalty range, regardless of the presence of
a departure provision, so a presumptive minimum sets the
floor despite the presence of one or more exceptions. There
is no basis for treating the effect of a departure provision for
the floor of the range any differently. Kansas lawmakers, for
example, did not regard the statutory exception there—
allowing a lesser term if the judge concludes ‘‘manifest
injustice’’ would result81—as protection from Alleyne’s
reach.82 Although Michigan courts refuse to agree, the
‘‘recommended’’ term before eligibility under that state’s
law is the mandatory minimum sentence under Alleyne,
even though a judge could impose a shorter term after
finding a ‘‘substantial and compelling reason.’’
Finally, whenever a statute requires that a trial court
must limit eligibility for release once it determines that
a certain fact is established, that minimum sentence
remains mandatory or ‘‘legally prescribed’’ despite the
possibility that the defendant may obtain earlier release
through clemency.83 Alleyne himself could theoretically
receive clemency at some point, too, but that possibility
didn’t make his seven-year term less mandatory in the
Court’s view.
III: Options for Compliance
This section provides guidance for courts and lawmakers in
states with statutes that may violate the rule in Alleyne. Steps
taken sooner rather than later to correct non-compliant
statutes will help reduce the disruption created by Alleyne,
minimizing the number of cases in which prisoners will be
able to challenge their convictions and sentences. The
options for bringing state law into compliance mirror those
used by states in the wake of the Court’s decision in
Blakely.84 In states where few statutes were implicated by
Blakely, the fix was fairly simple; in states where the entire
sentencing structure relied on mandatory guideline ranges,
more sweeping measures were necessary.
In states where only a limited number of statutes
include factfinding that restricts probation or parole release,
compliance with Alleyne may require minimal legislative
effort. For example, isolated statutes could be amended to
delete the aggravating fact, or to allow the judge to impose
the lesser sentence despite finding the aggravating fact.
Or, a legislature could replace existing mandatory mini-
mum sentence enhancements with lesser and greater
offenses. If the number of facts triggering mandatory
minimum sentences is small, a legislature could add
a provision guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for those
facts, alongside or after jury trial of the other elements of
the offense, a practice already followed in several states. The
Kansas legislature, for example, adopted this change for its
‘‘Hard 40’’ and ‘‘Hard 50’’ statutes, which previously
required the judge determine the facts that triggered
mandatory minimum sentences of forty or fifty years.
The newly enacted statute now gives juries the authority to
decide those aggravating factors, and whether there were
any mitigating factors to offset such a sentence. It also
creates a procedure to empanel new juries if it is necessary
to resentence defendants who are already serving hard-40
or hard-50 sentences.85
For states that rely heavily upon judicial factfinding to
set terms that must be served before eligibility for parole
release, or to determine eligibility for non-incarceration
sentences, it may be unrealistic to amend separately into
graded offenses all of the different crimes affected by
Alleyne. And treating as an element each of a very large
number of factors would create the same sort of challenges
that faced the Court in Booker under the Federal Guidelines.
Providing for a jury determination of facts implicated by
Alleyne may be more manageable after reducing the num-
ber of such facts,86 or allowing defendants to admit or opt
for a judicial determination on only those facts implicated
by the Apprendi rule while contesting remaining elements
(something like a partial plea or partial jury waiver).87 But
the most obvious remedy is the one adopted by the
Supreme Court in Booker and by a number of states after
Blakely: changing the ‘‘legally prescribed’’ ranges to advi-
sory ranges.88 This may involve invalidating or repealing
those aspects of the law that allow appellate courts to
enforce adherence to minimum sentences, thereby per-
mitting judges to exercise their discretion to impose lower
sentences despite finding aggravating factors at sentencing.
States may find the advisory option particularly attractive
if non-compliant provisions are littered throughout the
code or affect a large volume of cases. Take Michigan as an
example. Under the current scheme, the sentencing judge
is required to find and score a number of offense variables
(OVs) to determine the appropriate guidelines range for
a minimum sentence.89 If the guidelines were advisory,
the sentencing court would continue to determine the
recommended minimum term before parole eligibility,90
but would consider the ‘‘guidelines range as an aid,’’ not
a mandate.91
Another alternative might be to make the recommended
restrictions on release part of the guidelines governing the
paroling authority’s decision to release rather than part of the
judge’s sentencing determination. As parole release
guidelines, they would not affect the range available to the
trial judge at sentencing, escaping challenge under the rule
in Apprendi.
Finally, there is another option for coping with Alleyne
that we do not recommend. A state could shift the pre-
sumptive sentence for an offense up to the highest mini-
mum and reserve lower minimum sentences (i.e., earlier
eligibility for release) for those defendants who are able to
prove mitigating factors. As previously discussed, several
states have probation statutes designed in this way,
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presuming incarceration and placing the burden on
defendants to prove certain facts that would permit proba-
tion. But as an option for enforcing tiered levels of parole
eligibility based on facts found at sentencing, it makes little
policy sense. This system could produce higher pretrial
burdens if initial charges carried longer potential sen-
tences, as well as longer sentences of incarceration, thereby
raising even further costs that many states are attempting to
lower.
IV. Conclusion
The Court’s latest extension of the Apprendi rule in Alleyne
requires courts for the first time to identify when judicial
factfinding mandates a higher minimum sentence. This
has proven to be no simple matter when state statutes
require judges to delay or deny release on probation or
parole depending upon whether specified facts are deter-
mined at sentencing. State courts continuing to resist the
application of Alleyne to restrictions on release eligibility are
fighting a losing battle. A legislature need not abandon
efforts to calibrate eligibility for release with factfinding, but
it must select a method of doing so that complies with the
Constitution.
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